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Abstract—Transactive Energy Systems (TES) are modern electric power systems that enable decentralized owners of power
generation assets to engage in energy transactions and provide computing services that improve the performance of power system
operation. Blockchain technology is a key enabler of TES, allowing peers to engage in trustless, persistent transactions that are both
enforceable and auditable. However, previous work within this context has not adequately explored fraudulent service transactions
amongst peers, and its potential negative impact on power system operation. To that end, this paper proposes a blockchain based TES
that enables distributed peers (known as agents), to receive incentives for providing grid operation services in the form of voltage
regulation, which is a critical operational service. The proposed system i) maintains a trustless reputation rating for each agent that is
increased proportionately with each transaction that improves grid operation, ii) utilizes smart contracts to enforce the validity of each
transaction and penalizes reputation ratings in case of a fraudulent transaction, iii) automates the negotiation and bidding of agent
services by implementing the contract net protocol (CNP) as a smart contract. Experimental results on both simulated and real-world
power systems are executed to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed system.
Index Terms—Blockchain, grid services, distributed generation, voltage regulation, multi-agent, smart contracts, contract net protocol,
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1 INTRODUCTION
AGGRESSIVE climate change and sustainability initia-tives have brought much needed attention to the
overall operation and architecture of power systems. As
such, legacy power systems are rapidly evolving from a
centralized, monolithic architecture into a decentralized
and modular system that is required to be highly flexible,
reliable, and resilient. Where legacy power systems were
characterized by large, fossil fuel based power plants that
served end consumers via long-distance transmission lines,
the smart grid paradigm seeks to deploy smaller, renewable
distributed generators (DGs) that are placed closer to the
consumer [1]. Often, the DG utilizes green sources of energy
for power generation, which are largely solar and wind
based. This change in architecture results in the smart grid
evolving into a network of loosely coupled, yet cohesive
minitature grids (referred to as microgrids), each of which
is capable to handle its local power demand via DGs. The
implementation of microgrids can therefore significantly
decrease greenhouse gas emissions, decrease power losses
that occur due to long-distance power transmission, as well
as increase resiliency from outages that occur in the main
grid by utilizing backup power from the DGs.
In addition to the aforementioned benefits of smart grids,
additional key objectives are noted as the enhancement of
the role of active consumer participation in aiding system
optimization, as well as the need to improve the automation
of critical power system services in providing grid reliability
[2], [3]. The merging of these two objectives has evolved into
a concept known as grid services, where consumer owned
DGs can be used to provide ancillary services to the grid in
times of need [4]. Coupled with the increased digitization
of information and communication technology (ICT) infras-
tructure within power systems, grid services are viewed
as cyber-physical computing services that enable power
systems to move towards a service-oriented architecture
[5]. Critical grid services include: black start (restoration
of a section of the system without using power from the
main grid), load balancing and frequency control (correcting
power imbalances between supply and demand in real-time
and maintaining an appropriate system frequency), voltage
regulation (adjusting power outputs to maintain system
voltage throughout the system to prevent voltage violations
that could cause severe damage to grid assets), as well as
congestion management (adjusting power generation to pre-
vent excess power within transmission/distribution lines
that lead to excess power losses) [6].
The evolution of consumer provided grid services has
transformed the role of the previously passive consumer
into an energy prosumer, capable of providing both energy
and services to the grid in return for economic compen-
sation. This shift to service-oriented smart grids is best
exemplified by the concept of transactive energy systems
(TES), which seeks to combine economic objectives of all
stakeholders with distributed control techniques to improve
overall grid reliability and efficiency. The guiding prin-
ciples of TES’ place special emphasis on enabling non-
discriminatory participation by qualified participants, pro-
viding observable and auditable interfaces, and ensuring
that all parties are accountable for standards of performance
[7].
Considering these principles, blockchain has emerged as
a suitable platform for facilitating the implementation of
TES’. A blockchain is a type of distributed ledger, where
each party (peer) maintains a local copy of the ledger
and a consensus algorithm is used to ensure consistency
amongst all peers. Transactions submitted to the blockchain
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network during a given time period are collected in a
discrete block of data, verified by peers against a set of
rules that the network is governed by, and then appended
to the end of the blockchain in a tamper-proof fashion.
Transactions can be automatically enforced by the use of
smart contracts, which are software applications that are
deployed to the blockchain and auto-execute based on the
state of the ledger. As such, the ethos of TES’ align well
with the ethos of blockchains, where blockchains are non-
discriminatory due to consensus based decision making,
observable and auditable due to the immutability property
of the distributed ledger, and peers within the network can
be held accountable due to the enforcement of smart con-
tracts. Moreover, blockchains obviate the need for a trusted,
centralized point of authority to operate/administer the
TES, thereby allowing the trustless interaction of multiple
peers within the TES.
Blockchain based TES’ have proven popular in both aca-
demic and real-world initiatives. However, its main use case
has been applied to the implementation of decentralized
energy trading systems, which is the focus of approximately
33% of all active projects within this space [8]. The objective
of such systems is to exemplify how the implementation
of local energy markets can result in the mitigation of
large power imbalances while also unlocking new revenue
streams for prosumers. The most publicized example is the
Brooklyn microgrid (developed by LO3), where a neighbor-
hood of 10 homes can directly sell their excess solar energy
to each other at a price and time of their choosing. The
system is implemented via Ethereum based smart contracts
and based on the practical byzantine consensus protocol
(PBFT) [9]. Further variations in academia can be found in
[10], [11], [12], [13], all of which utilize smart contracts to
facilitate transactions amongst peers as well as to implement
a mathematical function to ensure that the market price of
electricity is fair and equitable (social welfare maximization,
double auction). However, the aforementioned work does
not mention the possibility of fraudulent transactions be-
tween peers and its impact on energy trades between peers
in the future, nor does it discuss how blockchains or smart
contracts could be utilized to prevent such an occurrence.
To that end, this paper proposes a novel blockchain
based TES that moves away from standard energy trading
applications and focuses instead on service oriented trans-
actions that improve power system operation. The system
enables distributed peers (referred to as agents) to operate
their DGs in an economically strategic manner to provide
grid reliability services in the form of distributed voltage
regulation. Voltage regulation is a critical component of
power system operation and control, and is greatly affected
by the penetration of DGs within the grid as voltage has
a direct relationship with power generation. In particular,
overproduction of power from DGs can lead to overvoltage
situations, which can cause overheating and damage to
power system infrastructure, while undervoltage can lead
to system collapse [14]. Voltage violations can be mitigated
by the strategic operation of DGs, and therefore, the agent
willing to provide such services can and should be finan-
cially compensated.
The implementation of the system is exemplified within
a power system that is divided into several zones that each
represent a prototypical microgrid, and where each agent
must regulate the voltage in its own zone. In the event
of voltage violations, an initiating agent solicits bids from
neighboring agents and awards a service contract to the
most suitable agent. A reputation rating is maintained for
each agent that is increased for each successful mitigation
of a voltage violation, and is penalized heavily if an agent
engages in a fraudulent transaction. A negative reputation
rating has a significantly negative impact in the ability of the
agent to procure bids in the future. The agent negotiation
process is implemented as a smart contract and is based
on a modified version of the contract net protocol (CNP)
[15]. The CNP is enhanced by adding an enforcement stage
after service contracts have been awarded to an agent, where
the smart contract validates the service contract by checking
the latest power measurement values of agent DGs on the
ledger to verify the successful mitigation of a voltage viola-
tion. To validate the system as a proof of concept, two sets
of experimental results are presented. The first set of results
utilize a model of a power distribution system and executes
the proposed TES to ensure that voltage violations can be
mitigated effectively. The second set of results involve a
real-world implementation of the TES at a smaller Canadian
microgrid located in Vaughan, Canada.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Proposing the novel implementation of a distributed
voltage regulation algorithm using blockchain tech-
nology. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, only
one previous paper has explored voltage regulation
in this context, but neglects to explore penalization
of fraudulent transactions or incentive schemes for
voltage regulation services. [16].
2) Modifying an existing agent negotiation protocol
(CNP) by adding an enforcement stage and im-
plementing it as a smart contract to handle the
initiation, negotiation, and finalization of all service
contracts between agents.
3) Execution of a real-world, off-chain simulation at
a Canadian microgrid to demonstrate how voltage
violations can be mitigated by distributed control
and communication.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows.
Section II provides background of the real-world microgrid
where the simulation results were executed, and describes
the challenges the microgrid operators face in addressing
voltage regulation. Section III presents the system mod-
eling of a typical power distribution system and defines
the mathematical relationship between a power injection of
an DG and the system voltage. Section IV introduces the
distributed voltage regulation algorithm and provides de-
sign principles for its implementation using the blockchain.
Section V introduces the blockchain system architecture
and design of the smart contracts to facilitate the agent
negotiation process. Section VI presents a selection of case
studies to demonstrate the efficacy of the TES, where the
simulations are executed on a large, simulated microgrid, as
well as a smaller, real-world microgrid. Finally, Section VII
is reserved for conclusions and future work.
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Fig. 1. The Kortright Centre Microgrid, located in Ontario, Canada. The
figure shows the solar DGs and smart homes that make up the west
side of the microgrid.
2 INTRODUCTION TO THE KORTRIGHT CENTRE
MICROGRID
The Kortright Centre Microgrid (KCM) is an initiative of
the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA),
which is the largest conservation authority in the Canadian
province of Ontario. The KCM is managed by the Sus-
tainable Technologies Evaluation Program (STEP), whose
mission is to increase awareness and adoption of innova-
tive low-carbon, green infrastructure solutions by way of
real-world demonstrations. Constructed in 2009, the KCM
consists of over 75 kW of renewable power capacity (solar
panels and wind turbines), over 100 kWh of battery en-
ergy storage, and two smart buildings that have intelligent,
energy saving thermostats. In total, the KCM spans over
2 acres of land and has over 700 monitoring and control
points dispersed throughout the area. Fig. 1 shows the solar
field and smart homes of the KCM. Starting in 2020, the
KCMwill construct 7 additional smart buildings that will be
owned by different stakeholders, each with varying degrees
of renewable DGs, energy storage, and loads.
KCM operators face significant challenges in managing
the KCM due to its unique voltage profile, which is domi-
nated by the dynamics of its solar and wind DGs. With peak
renewable power generation at 75 kW and a peak demand
of only 15 kW, the KCM produces significant excess power
even on moderately sunny days. As mentioned earlier, there
exists a positive correlation between power generation and
voltage, in that power injections lead to an increase in volt-
age. As such, the KCM experiences significant overvoltage
violations on a regular basis. The overvoltage violations
create excess heat that have caused damage to critical mi-
crogrid infrastructure, and regularly trip/reset protective
devices that require manual intervention to reset. A 2 hour
plot showing the extent of the overvoltage violations at the
KCM is shown in Fig. 2, where the normal operating voltage
of the microgrid should be 240V. According to power system
standards in Ontario, the maximum threshold for normal
operation for 240 V systems is 250 V (approximately 4.2%
of the nominal 240V), while the maximum threshold for ex-
treme operation is 254 V (approximately 5.2% of the nominal
240V) [17]. As seen in the figure, the voltage measured at
the KCM violates even the extreme operating conditions for
hours at a time.
As such, an implementation of voltage regulation ser-
vices under a TES paradigm would greatly benefit the KCM
Fig. 2. Overvoltage violations at the Kortright Centre Microgrid.
operators in preventing overvoltage violations and reducing
damage to critical infrastructure. Furthermore, recall that
the microgrid will accomodate seven new buildings within
the next year, each of which belong to different stakeholders
and will possess varying degrees of additional generation
capability. A blockchain based TES will certainly be needed
to facilitate and keep track of the level of contribution
that each building will have in the successful mitigation of
voltage violations, as well as to operate the TES in a non-
discriminatory and trustless manner.
3 MODELING OF POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
A modern power distribution system is shown in Fig.3,
where its infrastructure consists of a substation, buses,
distribution lines, DGs, and loads. The electric utility (or
distribution system operator) operates the substation, which
is responsible for receiving power from the upstream trans-
mission system, stepping down its voltage to an appropriate
level for the distribution system, and delivering it through
the downstream distribution lines. The lines connect differ-
ent buses together, which represent interconnection points
in the system and are analogous to nodes in networks. In
the figure, DGs and loads are connected to buses {i, j, k}.
The power flow within the system is dictated by the supply
and demand of the DGs and the loads, respectively. If the
total demand is greater than the supply of the DGs, power
flows from the substation to the downstream loads. If the
total demand is less than the supply of the DGs, power
flows from the DGs back towards the substation, which is
undesirable due to high power losses. Typically, the utility
owns and is responsible for the operation of the substation
and distribution lines, while the DGs and loads are owned
by the prosumer (agent).
Power flow within distribution system is typically alter-
nating current (AC), where sinusoidal waveforms of current
and voltage operate at a fixed frequency. When both wave-
forms are in phase, their multiplicative product generates
active power, and all power is transferred to the loads to
do useful work. However, when the waveforms are not in
phase, reactive power is generated, where power is stored by
the load for one cycle, and returned to the source in the next
cycle. Motors and lighting ballasts are examples of loads
that require reactive power. In power distribution systems,
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Fig. 3. Example power distribution system with connected DGs and
loads.
both active and reactive power injections have an affect on
system voltage, which will be seen in the remainder of the
subsection.
Generally, both the active/reactive power flows within
line i that connect buses i and j, as well as the voltage at
bus i can be expressed at time instant t as [18]:
Pi(t) = Pj(t) +
n=j−1�
n=i
�
PL,n(t)− PDG,n(t)
�
(1)
Qi(t)=Qj(t)+
n=j−1�
n=i
�
QL,n(t)−QDG,n(t)
�
(2)
V 2i (t)= V 2j (t)− 2
n=j−1�
n=i
�
rnPn(t) + xnQn(t)
�
(3)
where n is the line iterator, {Pn,Qn} are the output ac-
tive/reactive powers, {PL,n, QL,n} are the active/reactive
loads, {PDGn, QDGn} are the injected active/reactive pow-
ers from the DGs, Vi is the voltage at each bus, and {rn, xn}
is the resistance/reactance of each line (its overall internal
impedence). It should be noted that while (1) and (2) have
been formulated with respect to active/reactive (P/Q) in-
jections from DGs, it can be generalized to any distributed
energy resource (DER) that is capable of controlling its
output P/Q, such as battery energy storage systems (BESS).
DGs are capable of injecting active power within a system,
as well as injecting and absorbing reactive power.
From (1)-(3), it can be seen that changes in the in-
jected/absorbed active and reactive power play a dominant
role in shaping the voltage profile of the overall network.
Assuming the system is in steady state allows the neglection
of the change in load demand, and further linearization of
(3) leads to:
∆Vi(t) =
1
Vi(t− 1)
�
V1(t− 1)∆V1(t)+
∆PDG,i(t)
i−1�
n=i
rn +∆QDG,i(t)
i−1�
n=i
xn
�
(4)
The voltage at the substation is typically very stiff given
the overall impedance of the main grid. Given this, the
substation voltage (V1) is typically held steady and∆V1 can
be set to zero. This results in:
∆Vi(t) = ∆PDG,i(t)
i−1�
n=i
rn
Vi(t− 1)
+∆QDG,i(t)
i−1�
n=i
xn
Vi(t− 1)
(5)
It is now possible to determine the sensitivity of each bus
to any P/Q power injection/absorption as follows:
SPi =
∂Vi
∂Pi
=
i−1�
n=i
rn
Vi(t− 1)
, SQi =
∂Vi
∂Qi
=
i−1�
n=i
xn
Vi(t− 1)
(6)
Further, the impact of any control action (changes in P/Q)
at bus j on the voltage of bus i can be expressed by:
∆Vi(t) =
1
Vi(t− 1)
�
Vj(t− 1)∆Vj(t)+
∆PDG,i(t)
i−1�
n=i
rn +∆QDG,i(t)
i−1�
n=i
xn
�
(7)
From (7) it can be seen that the penetration of large
amounts of DGs within power systems can both cause and
mitigate voltage violations. Large injections of active power
may result in an overvoltage violation, whereas the curtail-
ment of active power and/or absorption of reactive power
may resolve the violation. As such, strategic coordination
amongst agent owned DGs is required to ensure that the
voltage throughout the system is within normal operating
conditions. However, this exposes the overall system to a
trust issue, wherein the system voltage is largely depen-
dent on the control actions decided by disparate agents.
Mitigating this trust issue is one of the key features of
the blockchain, and this will be discussed in the following
subsection.
3.1 Design Principles for Blockchain Implementation
Recall that under the proposed TES paradigm, agents are
awarded service contracts to mitigate voltage violations
via the P/Q operation of their DGs. The critical question,
therefore, is how to utilize the blockchain to trustlessly
enforce and validate such service contracts. Smart contracts
are an ideal candidate for this task, however, the information
the smart contract would need from the ledger, as well as
the business logic required to properly validate the service
contract must be defined. The required business logic is
defined in (7), where the level of impact of any agent owned
DG due to its power injection can be assessed in terms of
its level of contribution towards a voltage violation. This
logic would therefore require a static, nxn matrix of the
sensitivity of each bus towards P/Q modulation, the latest
P/Q measurements of each DG averaged over a discrete
time interval, as well as measurements of voltage at every
bus in the system.
The latter two measurements are readily observed by the
deployment of smart meters throughout the system, how-
ever, the on-chain complexity of storing this metered data
may severely degrade the performance of the blockchain
over time, which is a critical feature that limits its scalability
[19]. This type of big data challenge is faced in power
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Fig. 4. Example power distribution system partitioned into 4 zones, each
governed by an agent that operates the DGs in the zone strategically.
Measurements from smart meters allow agents to compute state esti-
mates about the voltage at each bus in its zone.
systems as well, which is why state estimation techniques
are used to gain an accurate estimate of the state with-
out deploying an excessive amount of monitoring points
within the system [20]. Methods for optimal allocation and
placement of smart meters in distribution systems, as well
as distributed state estimation techniques can be found in
[21], [22], [23], where the technique proposed in [23] is
used in this paper. Given this, the agent can query smart
meters locally and perform local state estimation off-chain,
while the engagement and verification of agent contracts
can be done on-chain with all relevant data available on
the ledger. In this way, the amount of data stored on the
ledger is reduced, the contribution of each DG towards the
mitigation is explicitly known, and automatic enforcement
can be performed by the smart contract by ensuring that
system voltage is within operating conditions.
4 PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED VOLTAGE REGULA-
TION ALGORITHM
So far, the discussion of voltage regulation has been con-
sidered in the context of a centralized implementation. A
distributed implementation involves spatially partitioning
the power distribution system into several zones, each gov-
erned by a software based agent as seen in Fig. 4. It is
assumed that the agent owns and operates the DGs within
its zone and is responsible for regulating the zonal voltage.
If it is unable to mitigate a voltage violation in its own
zone, it may solicit bids from neighboring agents to help
resolve the violation, as seen in Eq. (7). The neighboring
agents compute a price for their services, send a bid to the
initiating agent, and if successful, are awarded a service
contract that involves altering the P/Q output of its DGs to
resolve the violation. As such, this section will discuss the
algorithm that is divided into three stages. The first stage
utilizes real-time measurements from smart meters within
the zone to obtain state estimates for the voltage profile of
the zone to determine the presence of any violation. The
second stage presents the mathematical formulation of how
agents aim to bid for the procurement of a service contract.
Fig. 5. Flowchart for the proposed distributed voltage regulation algo-
rithm.
The third stage describes the negotiation protocol that the
agents use to come to consensus on how bids are fairly won.
A flowchart is provided in Fig. 5 to support the description
of the algorithm. Most importantly, design principles for
a blockchain based implementation will be included with
each stage of the distributed voltage regulation algorithm.
It should be noted that for the purposes of this paper, the
assumption is that each zone has only one DG, each agent
does not especially trust each other, and that the configu-
ration of the zonal boundaries is pre-decided to satisfy the
power adequacy constraint as in [24].
4.1 Stage I: Detection of Zonal Voltage Violation
Referring back to Fig.4, each zone is defined as zone z, and
governed by an agent with unique ID AID. All zones are
coupled with each other such that they have one bus in
common, referred to as the point of zone coupling PZCZ .
A small deployment of smart meters are placed at specific
buses within the zone, which the agent can query in real-
time to obtain measurements of power generation, demand,
and voltage at specific buses. As discussed earlier, state
estimation can be performed by the agent to take these par-
tial measurements and subsequently estimate the voltage
at each bus within the zone. Upon computing the estimate
of all voltages within its zone, the agent can determine the
presence of any voltage violation and attempt to resolve it
locally and/or initiate negotiations with neighboring agents
to resolve the violation. In the latter case, the agent must
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determine the voltage required at the PZC of its neighboring
zones that would effectively mitigate the violation in its own
zone. This can be determined from the following sensitivity
equation:
∂VPZC,z
∂Vi
=
VPZC,z(t)− VPZC,z(t− 1)
Vi(t)− Vi(t− 1)
(8)
where VPZC,z is the voltage at the PZC of the violated
bus i, and Vi is the voltage at the violated bus. The value
of VPZC,z(t) will be sent to each neighboring zone as the
target setpoint of the voltage at the shared bus between the
zones, as given by the power system standards governing
the region.
From the perspective of the blockchain implementation,
the querying of real-time data from the smart meters, as
well as the state estimation process can be done off-chain to
reduce the amount of data stored to the ledger. The estimate
of the zonal state of the agent does not hold value for the
rest of the agents, nor is there a trust issue that requires
consensus from other zones. For these reasons, the commu-
nication between agents and smart meters is best done via
a low-bandwidth communication middleware such as Data
Distribution Service (DDS), as discussed in [25], [26].
4.2 Stage II: Determination of Agent Bid Prices
A realistic implementation of a TES involves a competi-
tive market that allows disparate agents to offer bids for
services in return for economic compensation. Therefore,
agents are self-interested and rational, focused on earning
as much revenue as possible while also maintaining their
zonal voltage. The agent can earn revenue via the strategic
operation of the DGs in two ways: selling excess active
power back to the grid at the wholesale price of electricity,
or modulating the P/Q output of the DG to mitigate a
voltage violation as a grid service. An agent must ensure
that the control actions it selects for its DGs are economically
and operationally viable. The selection of control actions is
reminiscent of a classic optimization problem, wherein the
agent finds optimal values for its control actions {∆P,∆Q},
depending on device and system constraints, while seeking
to be as profitable as possible. It is important to note that
the optimization is run only when there is an instance of a
voltage violation, and as such, is an online process. This
results in the control actions and constraints being time-
varying. The control actions available to each zonal DG are
its active and reactive power output:
Xz = {∆PDG,z(t),∆QDG,z(t)} (9)
The constraints revolve mainly around the physical op-
erational limits of the zonal DGs as well as the physical
constraints of the distribution system infrastructure of the
zone itself. The constraints for the DGs are as follows:
CDG,z =



PDG,z(t) ≤ PMAXDG,z (t)
QDG,z(t) ≤ QMAXDG,z (t)�
P 2DG,z(t) +Q2DG,z(t) ≤ SMAXDG,z (t)
(10)
where {PMAXDG,z , QMAXDG,z , SMAXDG,z } are the maximum ratings of
the active, reactive, and apparent power settings of the DG.
Apparent power is the vector sum of active and reactive
power. It is worth noting that PMAXDG,z is further constrained
by the availability of the input fuel of the DG (whether gas,
diesel, solar irradiance, or wind speed).
The physical constraints of the zone are to obey the
maximum current carrying capacity of each distribution line
and to maintain the voltage between specified limits for each
bus within the zone.
CZ =
�
Ii,z(t) ≤ ICAPf,z ∀ i ∈ F z
VMINi,z ≤ Vi,z(t) ≤ VMAXi,z ∀ i ∈Mz
(11)
where ICAPf,z is the maximum carrying capacity of a dis-
tribution line f , {VMINi,z , VMAXi,z } are the minimum and
maximum voltage limits at each bus i, F z is the set of all
lines within zone z, and Mz is the set of all buses within
zone z.
Finally, the objective function of each agent can be for-
mulated as:
F =
�
Max −→ Rz(t)
Rz(t) = RDG,z(t) +RSRV,z(t)
(12)
where,
RDG,z(t) = PRP (t)× (PDG,z(t)×∆t) (13)
RSRV,z(t) = PRQ(t)×QDG,z(t)×∆t)+RDG,z(t)×α (14)
where Rz(t) is the overall revenue of an agent commanding
zone z, RDG,z is the revenue associated with the selling
of excess active power back to the grid, ∆T is a fixed
amount of discrete time, RSRV,z is the revenue associated
with providing voltage regulation as a grid service to other
agents, PRP is the wholesale price of active power that is
assumed to be set by the transmission system operator in the
day-ahead market [27], PRQ is the price of reactive power
that can be set arbitrarily by the agent, and α is a markup
factor that is used when a DG must reduce its active power
injection to help mitigate a voltage violation. An example of
the usage of markup factor would be when a zone has an
overvoltage violation, and requests another zone to reduce
the voltage at its PZC. If the neighboring zone must reduce
its active power generation to lower the voltage and resolve
the violation, it will result in a loss of revenue as per (13).
As such, a markup factor can be added to the grid service to
ensure that the agent recieves some profit instead of simply
meeting its marginal costs. The value of the markup factor
can be arbitrarily decided by the agent.
Solving the above optimization problem results in the
precise values for the ∆P and ∆Q setpoints of each DG in
the zone that can potentially mitigate a local or neighboring
voltage violation, as well as the final price of the agent bid.
Agents may still solicit bids from neighboring agents while
being fully capable of resolving the voltage violation locally
if the bids are less expensive than the local operation would
cost.
In order to further incentivize agents to participate in
the mitigation of voltage violations, as well as to guard
against fraudulent transactions, a reputation rating system
is established amongst all agents. The reputation rating is
a reflection of both the ability and trustworthiness of the
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agent to provide voltage regulation services to the rest of
the agents in the system. It is a crucial metric that heavily
influences the procurement of voltage regulation services
that earn additional revenue for the agent. The reputation
rating of the agent is increased with each successful mit-
igation of a voltage violation request, with the increase
being proportional to the severity of the voltage violation
as follows:
GNOWAID = G
PREV
AID + γ∆V (15)
where GAID is the reputation rating for an agent, the
superscripts NOW and PREV are representations of the
current and previous reputation ratings, respectively, ∆V
is the magnitude of voltage deviation, and γ is a scaling
factor that can be arbitrarily set in consensus with all agents
within the system. If an agent engages in a fraudulent
transaction, harsh penalties are imposed on its reputation
rating by setting γ to a negative value. Reputation ratings
are taken into account when agents compete in the bidding
process to procure grid services, and a negative reputation
rating greatly affects the ability of an agent to generate
revenue for itself. This is explored in further detail in the
next subsection.
Returning to the design of the blockchain implemen-
tation of the algorithm, the execution of the optimization
problem can be done off-chain, as it does not require any
of the existing data from the ledger. It is assumed that
the sensitivity factors that are stored on the ledger are also
available in the local memory of the agent in order to solve
the optimization problem. However, the maintenance of the
reputation rating metric is something that must be stored
and updated on-chain via consensus, particularly since it
is a sensitive metric that affects the revenue generating
ability of the agents. As such, allowing a smart contract to
automatically adjust the reputation rating of an agent after
validating the successful mitigation of a voltage violation is
a feasible solution to this problem. This obviates the need
for one of the agents, or a central authority, to manage the
reputation rating of all agents.
4.3 Stage III: Agent Negotiation Process
To lend structure to the negotiation process between the
agents, the well-known contract net protocol (CNP) is pro-
posed. The CNP was originally introduced in 1981 as a
negotiation protocol to be used in multi-agent systems to al-
low for efficient task allocation between agents [15]. Agents
using the CNP can be ”initiators” or ”responders”, in which
initiators request assistance from responding agents to com-
plete a particular task. The CNP has three stages, which are:
announcement, bidding, and assignment. In the announce-
ment stage, initiators that require assistance for a task send
a ”call for proposal” (CFP) to other agents that request them
to submit bids to obtain a prospective service contract. In
the bidding stage, responding agents compute and submit
bids to the initiator. Finally, in the assignment stage, the
initiating agent evaluates the contracts and awards them to
the agent(s) that have the best proposal, where the term
”best” is dependent on the context of the problem at hand.
It is worthwhile to note a responding agent can choose to
”subcontract” a task to another agent, thereby becoming the
initiating agent for the subcontract.
An example of the three stage CNP is described below
as an negotiation process between initiating Agent AIN and
responding Agents AR that are neighbors of Agent AIN . It
should be noted that the magnitude of voltage violation will
be addressed symbolically, however, it is assumed that they
are represented in the per unit style (p.u.), which represents
all system quantities as fractions of a base unit value:
1) Announcement: Agent AIN encounters a voltage
violation and determines the magnitude of volt-
age deviation needed at its PZC with Agent AR,
∆VPZC,z . This is computed using (8). Agent AIN
initiates a CFP to Agents AR in the form of a four-
tuple {AID, CFPID,∆VPZC,z,∆T}, where AID is
the initiating Agent ID, CFPID is the ID of the
CFP, and ∆T is the timeout period (in seconds) that
specifies how long the bid will remain valid.
2) Bidding: Agents AR evaluate the CFP by de-
termining its feasibility using (9)-(11). If success-
ful, each AR sends back a reply in the form of
{AID, CFPID, PRBID}, where PRBID is the price
of the bid and is computed by (12).
3) Assignment: Agent 1 collects all bids and multiplies
the bid price with the reputation rating of each agent
to determine the final bid price. The lowest bid
of the Agents AR is awarded the service contract
in the form {AID, CFPID, DEC}, where DEC is
a binary decision variable (1 for assignment, 0 for
rejection).
It can be seen that the determination of the best proposal
is a function of the bid price, as well as the reputation
rating of the agent. Therefore, it is vital that the agent
maintain a positive reputation rating to enhance its chances
of generating revenue for itself.
Within a blockchain implementation, it can be seen that
all agent transactions should be executed on-chain since
each transaction contains all the pertinent information that
can be used to enforce the awarded service contract. This
information includes: the bid price agreed upon by the
agents, the timeout period until the bid is valid, and the
magnitude of voltage violation the agent agrees to mitigate.
Using this information, a smart contract implementation of
the CNP would be used to i) validate that the initiating
agent has enough money to pay the responding agent, ii)
verify that all bids received past the timeout period are
invalid, and iii) enforce the service contract post-assignment
by checking the P/Q measurements of the responding agent
on the ledger along with the voltage measurements at the
PZC to determine that the violation was mitigated by the
rightful service provider.
The enforcement of the service contract between agents
warrants a modification to the existing CNP by adding an
enforcement stage after the assignment stage. If the smart
contract determines that the service contract was invali-
dated due to a fraudulent or failed transaction, penalties
should be levied upon the reputation rating of the respond-
ing agent and the announcement stage should recommence
with a new voltage deviation magnitude.
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5 BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TES
In reviewing the earlier outlined design principles for the
blockchain implementation of the TES, the following obser-
vations have been made:
1) The ledger should store the following data: P/Q
measurements of each DG, voltage measurements
from smart meters deployed at the PZC, voltage
sensitivity factors of each bus within the system,
reputation ratings of each agent, all CFPs, bids, and
awarded service contracts.
2) Of the above ledger data, the only items that require
dynamic updates are the reputation ratings and the
current dollar amount of each agent. The rest are
appended as new blocks at the end of the ledger.
3) A smart contract implementation of the CNP should
facilitate all aspects of an agent transaction, from
sending a CFP, evaluating the bids, awarding the
service contract, and enforcing the contract. After
the enforcement stage, the smart contract should
update the reputation rating of the agent providing
the service and arrange for the payment of the bid
price of the service contract.
4) Procedures involve state estimation of the voltage
profile of the zone, as well as the computation of
bid prices should be conducted off-chain.
From the above design principles, it can be seen that the
role of the blockchain is to obviate the need for an external
central authority to manage the complexity of regulating
the system voltage in the presence of disparate agents. This
role is traditionally played by power distribution system
operators (DSO), given that they own and operate the
distribution system. In the proposed implementation of the
TES, the role of the DSO is implemented in the form of
a smart contract. For this reason, another design principle
should be to enforce that the network should be private and
permissioned, instead of public and permissionless. Unlike
permissionless blockchains that are completely open to the
public (e.g. Bitcoin), permissioned blockchains require an
invitation to join the network. As a result, the identities of
the agents within the network can be known [28]. Permis-
sioned blockchains have found success in use cases where
there are shared business networks in which agents i) might
have conflicting incentives or ii) do not necessarily trust
each other, yet must still conduct transactions for a shared
business objective [29], [30], [31], [32]. Since an invitation
is required to participate in a permissioned blockchain,
the consensus algorithm is not susceptible to Sybil attacks,
alleviating the concerns about scalability and excessive en-
ergy use associated with permissionless blockchains [33],
[34]. The remainder of the section will discuss the system
architecture of the TES and implementation of the smart
contract.
5.1 Blockchain System Architecture
The proposed blockchain system architecture is depicted in
Fig. 6, where the vital components are the ledger, smart con-
tract, front-end interface, and the agent wallets. The front-
end interface is the interface by which a human operator can
access data inside the ledger. Within the ledger, P/Q
Fig. 6. Blockchain system architecture of the proposed TES.
Algorithm 1 Smart Contract Implementation
function initAccount()
Input: ZoneNum→Z ,Msg(Z)
Verify identity of agent usingMsg(Z)
Initialize agent account with AID←Z and BID→0,
Output: {AID, BID}
function createCFP()
Input: AIN ,∆VPZC,z, expiryCFP
Generate CFPID and deploy new CFP
Output: {AIN , CFPID,∆VPZC,z, expiryCFP}
function replyCFP()
Input: {AR, CFPID, PRBID, bidT ime} → bid
Create list to hold valid bids→ validBids
if PRBID ≤ BIN && bidT ime ≤ expireCFP then
append bid to validBids
end
function assignCFP()
Input: validBids
if currT ime ≥ bidExpiry then
Multiply each GAID with PRBID in validBids →
finalBids
bidWinner ← argmin(finalBids)
end
function enforceCFP()
Get P/Q measurements from ledger for AR over ∆T
Use (7) to calculate ∆VPZC,z
compare to ∆VPZC,z stated in service contract→ success
if success then
Update reputation rating of AR using (15)
Transfer PRBID from AIN wallet to AR wallet
else
Decrement reputation rating of AR using (15)
end
measurements are timestamped and indexed by the owning
agent, the reputation rating is maintained as a flat array, the
sensitivity factors are stored as an nxnmatrix, where n is the
number of buses within the system, and service contracts
are stored as a standard data structure. The smart contract
is utilized by the agents to execute all stages of the CNP
process, as indicated by the method names in the figure. The
agents access the blockchain either to record measurements
to the ledger or trigger instances of the smart contract when
a voltage violation is encountered. It is assumed that the
smart contract receives real-time P/Q measurements from
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smart meters that are placed at the output of the DGs within
the agent’s zone and automatically stores the measurements
to the ledger in discrete time intervals. Each agent has a wal-
let that stores its public and private keys {SKID, PKID},
respectively. The public/private keys are used by the agent
to digitally sign and verify transactions within the network.
5.2 Smart Contract Implementation
The implementation of the smart contract is devised as
a set of functions that mirror the CNP process, with an
added stage for the enforcement of service contracts. The
pseudo code for the smart contract is depicted in Algorithm
1, while a more detailed description is given below. For
the remainder of the text, AID will describe the unique ID
assigned to an agent, but to differentiate between initiating
agents and responding agents, the terms AIN and AR will
be used, respectively.
1) initAccount(): This function initializes an account
for the agent and assigns it an ID based on its
zone number. To verify the identity of the agent
calling this function, an input message that defines
the Zone ID and is digitally signed by SKID must
be provided to the function. Upon verification, the
functional initializes the number of dollars in the
agent wallet to zero (BID).
2) createCFP(): This function is called by an initiat-
ing agent, AIN , and creates a CFP that stores the
Agent ID, a unique ID for the CFP, the required
change in voltage needed at the PZC (∆VPZC,z),
as well as a timestamp for when the bid will expire
(expiryCFP ). The AIN signs the CFP with SKIN
and this generates a new CFP on the blockchain.
3) replyCFP(): This function is called by agents, AR,
responding to an active CFP with a bid price. The
function validates the incoming bid by checking i)
if the price of the bid is less than the balance of the
initiating agent and ii) if the recorded timestamp of
the bid is less than the expiry time of the CFP. If both
conditions are true, the bid is added to a list stored
in memory.
4) assignCFP(): This function is auto-executed when a
bid expires. The latest reputation ratings for each
agent are retrieved from the ledger, multiplied by
bid price, and sorted in ascending order. The lowest
cumulative bid is assigned the service contract.
5) enforceCFP(): This function is auto-executed after
the execution of the assignCFP() function. Using the
latest P/Q measurements on the ledger for AR over
a configurable time ∆T , as well as the sensitivity
factor of the bus where the DG of AR is located,
the change in voltage magnitude at∆VPZC,z can be
calculated and checked against the value specified
in the service agreement. If successful, the function
updates the reputation rating of the responding
agent and transfers the balance from the initiating
agent to the responding agent using (15). If not,
the responding agent’s reputation rating is heavily
penalized.
6 EXPERIMENTATION RESULTS
Two sets of experimentation results have been prepared to
demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed system. The first
set of results is conducted on the IEEE 37 bus system test
case that is depicted in Fig. 4, and is representative of a real-
world power distribution system. The second set of results is
from a real-world experiment conducted at the KCM. Exper-
iments were conducted off-chain, where the first experiment
was simulated using MATLAB and the second experiment
involved controlling the smart inverters with the MODBUS
protocol and DDS to facilitate inter-agent communication.
The discussion of the results will still reference the role of the
blockchain and smart contract within the implementation of
the results.
6.1 Case Study: IEEE 37 Bus Power System
The settings for the DGs within the system are shown in
Table 1, where the pricing for reactive power follows the
ranges of real-world power system operators as reported
in [35] and [36]. The markup factors have been arbitrarily
initialized, however, can change depending on the bidding
process. The reputation ratings for all agents are initialized
to 1, while its scaling factor is set to 10. The DG type is
assumed to be solar.
TABLE 1
Settings of DGs within studied IEEE 37 bus system.
DG Index PMAX QMAX PRQ α
1 1.0 0.6 1050 1.1
2 1.5 0 0 1.3
3 1.0 0.5 1200 1.2
4 1.0 0.5 1100 1.1
The experimentative results are depicted in Figs. 7-10,
based upon a 12 hour snapshot between the hours of 6:00
AM and 6:00 PM. Fig. 7 shows the active power generated
from the DGs, as well as its price as set in the wholesale elec-
tricity market, which was gathered from real-data from the
Ontario transmission system operator data archives (IESO).
This work assumes that the DGs use the wholesale price
of electricity as the price of active power, PRP (t), which
varies hourly. As can be seen in Fig. 7, DGs 1-3 experience
steady active power production throughout the time period,
however, DG2 experiences an outage from the hours of 7:30
AM to 9:30 AM. The direct correlation between active power
generation and voltage can be seen in Fig. 8, where the
voltage profiles for buses 33 and 37 can be seen. As DG
2 faces a power outage at 7:30 AM and drops its generation
to zero, an undervoltage violation occurs in its zone at bus
33. When the DG comes back online and reaches its capacity
at 10:30 AM, an overvoltage violation occurs at bus 37. Both
violations are mitigated by the proposed distributed voltage
regulation algorithm, where Fig. 8 shows the voltage profile
in both uncontrolled and controlled cases. The message
exchange between the agents can be seen in Figs. 9 and 10,
and is also explored in more detail below.
For the first undervoltage violation, Agent 2 issues a
smart contract (ID 1) that generates a CFP to Agents 1 and 3
specifying the voltage magnitude needed at their respective
PZCs to mitigate the voltage. Agent 2 computes a total
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Fig. 7. Plot of wholesale price of active power and DG active power
generation.
Fig. 8. Voltage profiles of buses 33 and 37 with (C) and without (U)
distributed voltage regulation.
reactive power injection of ∆Q=0.5691 p.u,, and responds
to the CFP with a marked up bid of $704, where Agent 3
follows a similar process and comes up with a setpoint of
∆Q=0.1296 p.u. and correspondingly submits a lower bid of
$257 using obj1. The smart contract evaluates the proposals
based on price, since the reputation ratings are equal at this
stage, and awards the service contract to Agent 2. The smart
contract enters the enforcement state, querying the ledger to
find the latest voltage measurement at the PZC of Agent 2
and 3, as well as the latest Q measurement from the DG of
Agent 2. After the bid expires, the smart contract penalizes
the fraudulent transaction of Agent 3 by 0.034 (multiplying
the scaling factor of 10 by the deviation required for miti-
gation 0.0034 p.u., resulting in the reputation rating being
0.966), and updates the ledger. The smart contract issues
a fresh CFP (ID 2), which is readily accepted by Agent
1, which when enforced by the smart contract, leads to a
voltage mitigation and an increase in reputation rating for
Agent 1 (1.0033). The service contract is honored for 2 hours
(until 9:30), when DG 2 comes back online, resulting in a net
earnings of $1408 for Agent 1.
In the case of the overvoltage violation, Agent 2 si-
multaneously generates a smart contract (ID 3) for both
neighboring agents, while also computing the total loss to
its revenue if it were to curtail the power locally, which is
Fig. 9. Agent message log for undervoltage violation.
Fig. 10. Agent message log for overvoltage violation.
a total curtailment of ∆P = 0.3 p.u., or $77.7 at the current
wholesale price of $222.2\p.u. Agent 1 executes (12), and
returns with setpoints of ∆Q= -0.50 p.u and ∆P= -0.38 p.u,
with a corresponding bid price of $750. Agent 3 computes
setpoints of ∆Q= -0.50 p.u and ∆P= -0.28 p.u., however,
seeking to reduce the reactive power needed in an effort to
reduce the cost of the bid, Agent 2 issues a CFP to Agent
4 downstream. A new smart contract (ID 4) is generated,
which specifies a voltage adjustment at the PZC between
Agent 3 and 4 to be -0.0106 p.u.. Agent 4 computes the
setpoints of its DGs to be ∆Q= -0.50 p.u and ∆P= -0.2 p.u,
and returns a bid price of $458 to Agent 3. Agent 3 rejects
this bid since the price of its own control actions would
itself result in an aggregated bid of over $1000. Seeking
to improve its reputation rating, Agent 3 reduces its bid
by 90% by applying a negative markup factor, essentially
providing the service at marginal cost. After finalizing the
bids, the smart contract applies the reputation rating of
Agent 2 to compute an aggregate bid price of $70, and
assigns the service contract to Agent 3 since it is less than
the bid of Agent 1 and also less than the $77 cost it will
cost Agent 2 to solve the problem locally. The smart contract
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Fig. 11. A single line diagram of the KCM and its controllable assets.
enters the enforcement stage upon verification of the voltage
magnitude of at the PZC,Z of Zone 2 and 3 (bus 7), as well
as the correct P/Qmeasurements from the DG of Zone 2, the
service agreement is validated. The smart contract upgrades
the reputation rating of Agent 2 to 0.99. The service is
provided for 5 hours, resulting in a net savings of Agent
2 of $35.
6.2 Case Study: Kortright Centre Microgrid
A simplified single-line diagram of the KCM is shown in
Fig. 11, where two agents are deployed at buses 3 and 4. At
bus 3, there is a 20 kW solar DG (SolarEdge 5000) that is
under the command of Agent 1, and at bus 4 downstream,
there is a 75 kWh battery bank (Xantrax 6848) and 5 kW
electronic load (e-load) that is under the command of Agent
2. In terms of measurements, there is a smart power quality
meter deployed at the point of common coupling (PCC)
between the KCM and the main grid , while measurements
of voltage are also read directly from the SolarEdge and
Xantrax devices at a sampling rate of 1 second. All agents
control the devices via the MODBUS protocol, but commu-
nicate with each other using DDS, which is a communication
middleware used in applications related to the Internet of
Things (IoT).
In Fig. 12, two major instances of overvoltage violations
are observed at timesteps 53 and 125 (1.052 p.u. and 1.053
p.u., respectively). This is due to the active power generation
by the solar DG and the lack of load within the system.
This can be seen in Fig. 13, where the net demand of the
KCM measured at the PCC is negative, indicating that 0.1
p.u. of active power is flowing back towards the main grid.
Once the voltage violation occurs, Agent 1 issues a CFP to
Agent 2, specifying the voltage deviation to be -0.02 p.u.
Agent 2 evaluates the feasibility of the request by assessing
the device constraints of the battery and e-load. Since these
devices do not have reactive power modulation ability, the
only option is to modulate active power. Agent 2 queries the
battery status, and finding that it is not online, immediately
switches on the e-load. As shown in Fig. 12, the voltage
immdiately begins to decrease until it reaches the setpoint
of 1.03 p.u. The control action of Agent 2 can be confirmed
by observing the plot of the demand of the KCM after
Fig. 12. Voltage profile at bus 3 during experiment.
Fig. 13. Coordination of agents mitigate violation by activating loads
downstream.
timestep 52. Previous to accepting the CFP from Agent 1,
the demand was -0.1 p.u., while afterwards, the demand
increased to -0.05 p.u., thereby decreasing the voltage at bus
3. The experiment is repeated again at timestep 125 with
similar results.
It should be noted that the experiment was conducted
off-chain and without incentives, because all agents are
operated by the KCM. However, the purpose of the ex-
periment was to prove that strategic, distributed con-
trol/communication methods can be effective in mitigating
real-world problems. In the case of the KCM, the deploy-
ment of the agents has completely mitigated any occurences
of voltage violations.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a blockchain based, transactive energy
system to allow disparate agents that own DGs to provide
voltage regulation services to the grid in return for economic
compensation. The implementation of these cyber physical
computing services were facilitated by the implementation
of a smart contract that impartially audits each service
contract between agents and enforces its validity by directly
observing power measurements on the ledger provided by
smart meters throughout the power distribution system.
The major contributions of this work were to investigate
the impact of fraudulent/failed transactions on power dis-
tribution system operation and its financial implications on
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agent interactions as a result. As such, the solution proposed
a reputation based rating system that was increased and de-
creased based on the successful/unsuccessful execution of
service contracts between agents, and significantly affected
the agents ability to generate revenue in future transactions.
The efficacy of the system was tested on both a large,
simulated model of a power distribution system, as well
as a real-world Canadian microgrid, where experimental
results showed the ability for distributed agents to resolve
voltage violations. Future work within this space involves
validating the implementation of the smart contract within
a permissioned blockchain platform such as Hyperledger
Fabric to ensure that consensus can be achieved in a dura-
tion suitable for real-world deployment.
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